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Abstract 
Verifying temporal specifications of reactive and concurrent systems commonly relies on gen- 
erating auxiliary assertions and on strengthening given properties of the system. This can be 
achieved by two dual approaches: The hottom-up method performs an abstract forward propaga- 
tion (computation) of the system, generating auxiliary assertions; the top-down method performs 
an abstract backward propagation to strengthen given properties. Exact application of these meth- 
ods is complete but is usually infeasible for large-scale verification. Approximation techniques 
are often needed to complete the verification. 
We give an overview of known methods for generation of auxiliary invariants in the verifica- 
tion of invariance properties. We extend these methods, by formalizing and analyzing a general 
verification rule that uses assertion graphs to generate auxiliary assertions for the verification of 
general safety properties. 
1. Introduction 
The deductive verification of temporal specifications of reactive and concurrent sys- 
tems commonly relies upon finding suitable auxiliary assertions and strengthened prop- 
erties [ 171. This paper describes a general framework for generating invariants and 
intermediate assertions that can help in the verifications of general temporal safety 
properties. General temporal safety formulas can express properties such as invariance, 
first-in-first-out ordering, causality, and bounded overtaking. 
Deductive methods provide a verification rule that proves invariance properties by 
establishing first-order premises. These premises often require an auxiliary invariant 
which strengthens the invariance property being proved. There are two ways to find 
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the strengthed invariant: forward propagation (bottom-up method) is a symbolic forward 
execution of the system Y yielding an invariant hat characterizes the set of reachable 
states; backward propagation (top-down method) is a symbolic backward execution 
of 9 from the states satisfying the invariance property being proved, yielding an in- 
variant that characterizes the states that maintain the invariance property. We will see 
that both methods, in principle, generate adequate auxiliary invariants. Early work 
on forward and backward propagation in sequential program verification includes 
f8,15]. More recently, [ 1,171 have extended the methodologies to conc~ent 
systems. 
This paper extends traditional methodologies for invariance properties by formulating 
a new inference rule and analyzing it to obtain new methods for general safety formulas. 
Our main tool is the use of assertion graphs that summarize the models of safety 
formulas. The exposition demonstra~s a tight co~ection between the ve~fication rule 
and the duality of backward and forward propagation. 
Exact forward or backward propagation of a system Y may not terminate when the 
state space of Y is infinite or unmanageably arge. This motivates the study of ap- 
proximate, but terminating, propagation methods over different domains. Genera1 safety 
formulas were first treated in [3] where techniques from linear algebra, linear program- 
ming and monadic second-order logic were applied in several case studies of approxi- 
mate propagation. Linear algebra has long been applied to the automatic discovery of 
linear equalities between system variables [14,16]. Linear programming was proposed 
in [6] to express linear constraints among system variables in the form of convex 
polyhedra. It is also one of the most prominent examples of the abstract inte~retation 
theory introduced in [5]. Real-time systems can be analyzed using successive over- and 
under-approximations of propagation with convex polyhedra [7]. Monadic second-order 
logic applied in set-based program analysis [ 1 l] provides unary constraints on the val- 
ues of program variables. The case studies used in this paper overview some of these 
techniques while extending them to handle parameterized systems. In particular, we 
show how polyhedral analysis can be extended both with respect o p~amete~zation 
and general safety properties. The use of approximation domains appeals in general 
naturally to techniques developed in constraint programming. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes preliminary notions such as 
the computational model of reactive systems, linear-time temporal logic and fixedpoints. 
In Section 3 we present he ve~~cation rule and introduce bosom-up and top-down 
methods for invariance properties. The methods are extended to handle general safety 
properties in Section 4. Section 5 introduces approximation techniques to support he 
exact methods presented in Sections 3 and 4. In the same section, approximation is 
used to establish invariance and general safety properties for examples where exact 
propagation would fail. 
Some of the methods described in this paper are included in a released version of the 
verification system STeP, the &Ttunford Bmporal Prover [2]. STeP verifies linear-time 
temporal logic specifications of reactive and concurrent systems, combining algorithmic 
and deductive techniques. 
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2. Preliminaries 
2.1. Transition systems 
Following [17], our computational model for reactive systems is that of a transition 
system, Y = (V, 0, F), where V is a finite set of system variables, 0 is the initial 
condition, and Y is a finite set of transitions. Fairness assumptions are ignored when 
establishing safety properties, so the usual sets of just and compassionate transitions 
are omitted. The vocabulary V contains data variables, control variables and auxiliary 
variables. The set of states (interpretations) over V is denoted by C. We assume a 
first-order assertion language d over V. The initial conditions 0 is an assertion in 
this language. A transition r maps each state s E C into a (possibly empty) set of 
r-successor states, r(s) C_ 1‘. The mapping associated with r is defined by an assertion 
- --I P~(X,X ), called the transition relation, which relates the values X of the variables in 
state s and the values X’ in a successor state s’ E r(s). We require that Y contains a 
transition ZI, called the idling transition, such that r(s) = {s} for every state s. 
A computation of a system 9’ is an infinite sequence of states SO,S~,S~, . . , such 
that SO is an initial state satisfying 0 and for every i > 0 there is a transition t E F 
satisfying Si+l E Z(Si). 
To facilitate the representation of systems, some of our examples are given in SPL 
(simple programming language), which is used to represent concurrent programs in 
[2, 171. SPL statements are translated into transitions in a straightforward manner. For 
example, the assignment statement 
eo:x:=JJ+l; e,: 
assigns y + 1 to x when control resides at location 80, and simultaneously moves control 
to tr. The transition r corresponding to this statement has the transition relation 
p,(& e,,x, y to’, &x’, y’) : at-to Ax’ = y + 1 A y’ = y A utJ[ A -%t_e,l. 
2.2. Preconditions and postconditions 
The weakest precondition WP(T, q)(X) and strongest postcondition SP(T, q)(x) of an 
assertion cp(X), relative to a transition r, are defined by 
- --I 
WP(T, q)(X) 4 V’x’ . &(X,X ) --f c&z’), 
SP(T, cp)(X) 4 3x0 . p&),X) A cp(Xo). 
WP characterizes the states that must reach a q-state (i.e., a state satisfying cp) by 
taking r. SP characterizes the states reachable from a q-state by taking r. 
For example, transitions associated with guarded assignments of the form if C(X) 
- --I then X := e(F) have transition relations of the form &x,x ) : c(X) AX’ = e(x). Their 
weakest precondition, WP(Z, q)(X) : VX.c(X) A X’ = e(T) + c&i?), can be simplified to 
wP(r, cp)(X) : c(X) + cp(e(Z)). 
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The two operators are monotone in cp since all occurrences of cp are positive, i.e., 
they are under the scope of an even number of negations. Thus, 
(cp + $1 -+ (wp(r, cp) + wp(r, $11, (q -+ $1 + (sp(r, cp> + sp(r, $1). 
Also, 
wp(r, V A $1 ++ wp(r, cp> A wp(r, $), sp(r, cp v $1 (--t sp(r, cp> v sp(r, II/), 
wp(r, cp v $1 + wp(r, cp> v wp(r, $1, sp(r, V A $1 + sp(r, cp) A sp(r, $1. 
We will also use the notation 
wp(Z-,) 4 A wp(r,(P), SP(F, cp) 42 v SP(T, cp). 
TEY 7E.T 
Notice that 
cp + WP(F, $) iff sP(F, cp) + +. 
2.3. Linear-time temporal ogic 
We specify properties of reactive systems using linear-time temporal logic. Linear- 
time temporal logic allows us to specify behaviours over the set of all computations 
of a system. A temporal formula is constructed from state formulas (assertions) which 
are formulas from the first-order assertion language d. To state formulas we apply 
boolean connectives (such as 1, A, V,+ in order of falling precedence), quantifiers 
(V’, 3) and temporal operators. 
The temporal operators used in this paper are future operators III (always in the 
future), W (waiting-for, unless), 0 (next), and their past counterparts q (always in 
the past), B (back-to) and 0 (previously). 
A model for a temporal formula cp is an infinite sequence of states cr : SO, ~1, ~2,. . , 
where each state sj provides an interpretation for the variables occurring in cp. Given 
a model cr, we present an inductive definition of the notion of cp holding at position 
j, ja0, in g, denoted by (o,j) /= cp: 
(o,j) k cp H Sj k C/9 if q E ,c4 
That is, cp is evaluated locally, using 
the interpretation in Sj 
(g,j) I= 9 @ (r4j + 1) k V 
(Q,j) I= q cp H Vj’:j’aj.(cr,j’) /=cp 
(0,j) + cpW$ ++ tj’ : j'2j. (0,j') b cp or 
3k:k~j.(o,k)~=andtj’:j~j’<k.(a,j’))=cp 
(o,j) k Qcp H j > 0 and (~,j - I) b cp 
(o,j) k q cp H Vj’ : O<j'<j . (0,j') + cp 
(cr,j) /= cpB+ H t/j’ : O<j'<j. (o,j') + cp or 
Clk:O<k~j~(o,k) /=$ and Vj’:j>j’> k.(o,j’) kq. 
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Other temporal connectives are defined as abbreviations, e.g., +p = 7 01 cp, 0~ = 
TrsTcp. 
A temporal formula cp is Y-valid, denoted 9’ k cp, if for each computation ~7 of 
Y, (v, 0) + cp. A state s is said to be an Y-reachable state if it can be reached by some 
computation of Y. A state formula rp is Y-state-valid ifs k cp for every Y-reachable 
state s of 9. See [ 171 for a more detailed discussion of linear-time temporal logic and 
reactive systems. 
2.4. Fixedpoints 
For a monotone operator G : d H d, such as WP and SP, we write the least fixedpoint 
as pFLx. G(X) and the greatest fixedpoint of G as vX .G(X). To give meaning to the 
fixedpoint operators p and v we introduce denotations [[(P]~ of assertions cp in &, where 
p maps free predicate symbols to subsets of C. By [IqjP we will understand the set of 
states s E C, such that rp holds in state s when free predicate symbols are interpreted 
by p; in short: I[cpjP = {s E C 1 p,s + cp}, In particular [G(X)],ls/~l is the denotation 
of G(X) where the modified substitution p[S/X] maps the free predicate symbol X 
to S and behaves like p for every other predicate. The denotations of the fixedpoint 
operators are now defined as 
I@. G(X)1 4 n {s c z 1 J[w%x] C sh 
Ivx.G(WJI 4 U{ScCISc[[G(X)]l[s/~]}. 
The monotonicity of G ensures that [[&Y.G(X)] is the unique least fixedpoint, i.e., the 
least set S C C such that S = [G(X)]ls/xl, and that [vX. G(X)] is the unique greatest 
fixedpoint. 
Searching for fixedpoints in the assertion language d itself, we apply G repeatedly 
starting from F (false). If the ascending chain F, G(F), Gc2)(F), . . . converges in a finite 
number of iterations, its limit is an assertion in d equivalent to @. G(X). Similarly, 
we can generate the descending chain T, G(T), G@)(T),. . ., starting from T (true); 
if it converges an assertion in &’ is produced which is equivalent to vX. G(X). In 
general, the generated sequences are not guaranteed to converge to the fixedpoints in 
a finite number of steps. 
3. Invariance 
An assertion p is Y-invariant (invariant for short) if Y k op. To establish that 
a given assertion p is Y-invariant, we use the verification rule INV (Fig. 1). This 
sound and relatively complete 2 proof rule reduces the verification of up to first- 
order premises. For a given transition system Y and assertion p, to prove that up is 
Y-valid, we have to find a strengthened assertion CQ such that the first-order premises 
’ Completeness is here understood relative to the expressibility of the first-order language 
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For transition system S : (Y, 0, ‘T), and 
assertions p and ‘p 
Fig. 1. Rule INV (invariance) 
I l-13 are Y-state-valid. In premise 13 we use the notation { q}Y{ $} 4 ArEY { cp}z{ 1c/} 
where each verijication condition { cp}~{ t,b} can be expressed equivalently in any of 
the following forms: 
standard: V’XV’X’ . [cp(X) A p&X’) + I@‘)], 
weakest precondition: KC. [CPW + WP(? $)(X)1, 
strongest postcondition: v’x’ . [SP(T, q?)(Y) + I@‘)]. 
When establishing premises 11-13 of rule INV it is sound to assert any previously 
established invariant $ as an axiom. This will be used throughout the paper. 
The main difficulty in using rule INV is finding the strengthened assertion cp. We 
now show that the strongest and weakest candidates for cp can be given fixedpoint 
characterizations. 
3.1. Forward propagation 
Define the operator F by 
P,(X) 4 OVSP(T,X). 
A formula cp satisfies I1 and I3 iff F(cp) -+ cp. 
then 9(X1) + 9(X2), the fixedpoint formula 
(ps: ,UX.9(X) 
Since F is monotone, i.e., if Xl -+ X2 
provides the strongest assertion cp satisfying I1 and 13. We therefore have 
WI @+ (~9, WI NT, cps) -+ cps. 
Notice that cp,~ precisely characterizes the set of reachable states: 
state s is Y-accessible iff s /= cp~. 
The implication from left to right holds for any formula satisfying I1 and 13; the 
converse holds because cps is the strongest such formula. 
As .9 is monotone, if the sequence starting from F (false) 
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converges in finitely many steps, i.e., (Pi ++ (P~+I is 9-state-valid for some n, then its 
limits (cp,) is cp,~. 
3.2. Buckward propagation 
Given an assertion p, define the monotone operator 98 by 
,&Y) 4 p A WP(Y, Y). 
A formula satisfies 12 and 13 iff cp -+ 99(q). The greatest fixedpoint 
cp.*: vY.qY) 
provides the weakest cp satisfying 12 
(Bl) (P.# - P, (B2) (P.?B + 
and 13. We therefore have 
cp~ precisely characterizes the p-invariant stutes i.e., the states where every computa- 
tion of Y starting in s satisfies op. 
Since 99 is monotone, if the sequence starting from T (true) 
A +%&my- plJ + ‘.. 
VPa 'PI CP ? 
converges in finitely many steps, then its limit is q.4. 
3.3. The forward/backward duulity 
Abstract state space exploration from the set of initial states, also called forward 
propagation (bottom-up analysis), does not depend on the system property p we want 
to establish. Backward propagation (top-down analysis), on the other hand, explores 
the state space starting with the p-states. 
Since cp.~ captures exactly the reachable state space, whereas cpg only collects 
enough information to establish p, one can prove that the following are equivalent: 
1: O-t(p#, 2: cp.F 4 p, 3: cp.p + cp$, 4: p is y-invariant. 
The correspondence is best illustrated by the commuting diagram: 
where the horizontal implications are given by the fixedpoint equations. If one of the 
downwards directed implications is present, all the others must also be. 
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The diagram suggests that if p is an invariant, then the (~9 states are a subset of 
the cpg states as reflected in Fig. 2. 
As Fig. 2 shows, the p-invariant states, given by cpa, are a subset of the p-states, 
which are those states where p holds but is not necessarily preserved by the transitions. 
3.4. An example of forward and backward propagation 
We analyze program BAKERY (Fig. 3) using both forward and backward propagation. 
The program guarantees mutual exclusion, that is, & and rn3 are never reached at the 
same time. Synchronization is provided by the integer variables yl and ~2, which can 
be thought of as numbers used in waiting-lines at bakeries. 
Forward propagation. The method requires computing the sequence 
& -+ w + w -+ ... 
rpo ‘PI (P2 
until a limit is found. 
Fig. 4 represents the iterations of F as layers in a directed graph, growing bottom- 
up from the initial condition cp1 : 0. The ith iteration of 9, represented by cp;, is the 
disjunction of the nodes that are reachable from the source on a path of at most depth 
i- 1. 
tate space: X 
A&ate5 
Fig. 2. State space. 
local yI,y2 : integer where yl = yz = 0 
P, :: 
loop forever do 
&: noncritical - 
er: y1 := yz + 1 
e2: await(y2=0v )I Pz:: 
Yl 5 Yz) 
es: critical 
_e,: y1 := 0 
loop forever do 
rno : noncritical 
ml : yz := y1+ 1 
7nz : await (yl = 0 V 
Yz < Yl) 
77z3 : critical 
,m4:yz:=O 
Fig. 3. Program BAKERY (Program BAKERY for mutual exclusion). 
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at_tlAat_moAyl=y*=O at_&,Aat_m,Ay, =yz=o 
Fig. 4. Forward propagation 
From the initial condition 0 we calculate 
SP(Z 0) = v SP(Z, 0) = SP(Z[,, 0) v SP(ZmO, 0) 
?ET 
= (at-81 A at-m0 A yl = y2 = 0) V (atJo A at_ml A y1 = y2 = 0) 
which generates the two disjuncts just above 0. An additional iteration of 9 generates 
the three disjuncts at the third level. The sequence cpt, (~2, (~3,. . does not converge to 
a fixedpoint in a finite number of steps, since (P5k A at-42 A at-m2 is equivalent to 
However, it is possible to express the strongest invariant (representing the reachable 
state space) of the program by the assertion: 
cP9 : [at-&l A at-ma,1 A yl = 0 A y2 = 0] 
V [at-&l A at-m2,3,4 A y1 = 0 A y2 2 l] 
V [at-e2,3,4 A at-mo,l A yl 2 1 A y2 = 0] 
V[Qt-~zAUt-m2Ay~8lAy2~lAly~-y2I=l] 
V [at-e2 A at-m3,4 A y2 > 1 A yl - y2 = l] 
V [at-&,4 A at-m2 A y1 b 1 A y2 - y1 = 11. 
Backward propagation. Backward propagation starts from an invariant candidate, in 
this case 
q T(at-83 A at_m3), 
which expresses mutual exclusion in the critical sections. 
We compute the terms of the sequence 
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Fig. 5. Backward propagation from -(at-& A at-m,). 
until a limit is found. Applying .!?J once generates cpi : -(at4 A at-m3). In the second 
iteration of 39 we calculate: 
wp(Z’,cp1)= A wp(5cp1) =Wp(Zg2,(Pl)~wp(Zm*,(PI) 
TEF 
= (at-82 A at-m3 -+ y2 # 0 A yl > y2) 
A (at-83 A at-m2 + yl # 0 A y1 < ~2). 
Continuing mechanically in this fashion we obtain the formulas shown in Fig. 5. By 
calculating WP(T, cp), where r labels an edge pointing to a q-node, one obtains the 
assertion labeling the source of the edge. The conjunction of the formulas is the greatest 
fixedpoint cpg of @. The auxiliary invariants q (yi 2 0) and q (y2 30) were used to 
simplify the examined conjuncts. These invariants can be generated automatically using 
for instance approximate forward propagation in the closed convex polyhedra domain, 
which is described later in this paper. Finally, since 0 : at_& A at-m0 A yi = y2 = 0 
implies cpg, we have indeed established mutual exclusion of the critical sections. 
The example shows the power of backward propagation: a completely automatic 
search terminates with a strengthened invariant. The analysis described above is entirely 
automatic in STeP. Forward propagation, on the other hand, does not converge in 
finitely many steps because the program’s set of states cannot be reached in finitely 
many iterations. 
4. General safety 
A general safety formula p is one equivalent to a temporal formula of the form 
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where q is a past formula, that is, a formula that does not contain any future temporal 
operators. 
Example (General safety formulas). The state-causality formula 
o[p--‘Or] 
. , 
past 
for assertions p and Y, is a general safety formula. A model satisfies this formula if 
every p-position coincides with or is preceded by an r-position. 
The nested waiting-for formula 
O[P 4 41 W(qz w r>l 
for assertions p, 41, q2 and Y is a general safety formula. A model satisfies this 
formula if every p-position initiates a qi-interval, followed by a qz-interval, that may 
be terminated by an r-position. Each qi-interval, i = 1,2, is a set of successive positions 
all of which satisfy qi, and may be empty or extend to infinity. In the latter case, there 
need not be a following interval nor a terminating r-position. This is a general safety 
formula, since it is equivalent to the formula 
0 KT2) + qlB((~p) B r)l. 
past 
4. I. Assertion graphs 
An assertion graph G = (N, NO, E, 2) is a labeled directed graph where 
N _ set of nodes 
NO C_ N - initial nodes 
ECN xN - edges 
i, : N H ~2 - mapping from nodes to assertions. 
G is an assertion graph for p if it describes exactly the models of p, i.e., for every 
model g : SO,SI,. . . , (o,O) b p iff there exists a path Q(E NO), ni,. . . in G such that 
si + n(PZi) for every i>,O. 
Lemma 1. Given a general safety formula p, where temporal operators do not appear 
in the scope of quantijers, an assertion graph for p is computable. 
Proof (sketch). To simplify the exposition we use the property that p is equivalent 
to a formula q cp such that cp is a past temporal formula in which the only boolean 
operators are 7 and A, the only temporal operators are B and o and no temporal 
operator is in the scope of a quantifier. 
Let cl(q), the closure of cp, be the set of all subformulas f of cp and their negations. 
Thus, for example, cl(pBq) = (p,q,~p,~q,pBq,~(pBq)}. 
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Let G = (N, NO, E, A) be the assertion graph with the following components: 
N C 2”(9) where n E N iff 
(a) cp E 4 
(b) for any f E cl(q), f E n iff lf $ n, 
(c) fi A f2 E n iff fi E n and f2 E n, 
(d) if fiBf2 E n then f, E n or f2 E n. 
No&Nwheren~Noiff@f$nforevery~f~cl(cp). 
(nl,n2) E E iff 
(a) for any Of Ed(q), Of En2 iff f Enl, 
(b) for any flBf2 E c&cp), 
fiBf2 E n2 iff either f2 E n2 or fiBf2 E nl. 
A(n) = A{f E n 1 f is first-order}. 
It can be shown that G is an assertion graph for p. 0 
The outline given above is a simple modification of the well-known tableau con- 
struction [ 171. One can also construct a tableau directly from the temporal formula 
without going into past-normal form. The construction requires us to consider more 
special cases, but guarantees that the assertion graph is of size 2’(lPl). 
Example (Assertion graph). For program BAKERY in Fig. 3, the l-bounded overtaking 
property for process PI is expressed by the general safety formula Pbo&. 
q [at_/2 + (at-4 A ~at_ms)W((at-~2 A at-m3)FV((ut-82 A Tut-m3)W at-83))]. 
That is, whenever process PI reaches 82, process 9 can access its critical region at 
most once before PI reaches its critical region at 83. 
An assertion graph G for PbO& is shown in Fig. 6. Statechart conventions [lo] are 
used for a more compact graphical representation. For example, the edge departing the 
compound node containing ni, n2, n3 to n4 represents he edges (nl, q), (n2, n4), (n3, n4). 
The arrows without sources indicate initial nodes, thus, No = {no,nl,n2}. The label 
at_& in the compound node distributes as a conjunct to the encapsulated nodes nr, n2 
and n3. 
For a node n E N, we say that a state s is (9, n)-accessible if there exists a finite 
computation SO, si , . . . , Sk, of 9, where s = Sk, and a finite path no, nl,. . . , nk in G such 
Fig. 6. An assertion graph G for property pbun,j 
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that no E NO, n = nk, and for 0 <j < k, si /= %(n;). An assertion cp is (.Y,n)-valid if it 
holds for every ( cY, n)-accessible state. 
The verification rule SAFE shown in Fig. 7 reduces the verification of the general 
safety formula p to first-order premises Sl-S3. Suppose we have a transition system 
,Y, a general safety formula p and an assertion graph G for p. To prove that p is 
Y-valid, we have to find intermediate assertions {(P,,},,~N such that premise Sl is 
cY-state-valid and for each n E N, S2 and S3 are (9, n)-valid. 
Lemma 2. Rule SAFE is sound. 
Proof. Assuming the premises of Sl-S3 of SAFE are satisfied, we must 
is <Y-valid. Consider an arbitrary computation 0 : so,sl, . . of cY, i.e., 
SO b 0 and V’iaO !lr E .y. (si,si+r) b p,(X,X’). 
We show that g b p. By premise S3 we have 
VJi>O VnEN.[sikcp, 4 3m . (n,m) E E A si+l k (~~1. 
show that p 
By premise Sl, 3n ENo.so + (Pi. Thus, by induction on i, it follows that Vi>0 
3n E N . si /= (P,,. Hence, by S2, (T induces a path no(E NO), nl, . . . on G such that 
Si b n(ni) for every i30. Therefore, rr is a model of p. q 
Lemma 3. Rule SAFE is relatively complete for general safety formulas where tem- 
poral operators are not in the scope of quantijers. 
Proof (sketch). Let p be an Y-valid general safety property with no temporal operators 
in the scope of a quantifier. By Lemma 1, there exists an assertion graph G for p. 
Assuming p is Y-valid we must establish that there are assertions {(P~}~~N satisfying 
premises Sl-S3. By encoding finite sequences and corresponding operations in the 
assertion language & (assumed to be sufficiently expressive), it is possible to construct 
For transition system S = (V, 0. T), 
general safety formula p, 
assertion graph G = (N, No, E, A) for p, and 
assertions {ip”}nE,P$ 
Fig. 7. Rule SAFE (general safety). 
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a formula acc(Y, n) for each IZ E N, such that 
s /= acc(Y, n) iff s is (Y,n)-accessible. 
The assertions { acc( Y, n)}nEN trivially satisfy the premises of SAFE. 0 
Finding useful strengthened assertions {(P,,}~~N for rule SAFE is the main obstacle in 
its use; assertions {acc(Y, n)},~, seldomly provide useful information for an automatic 
verifier. Similar to the analysis of INV we now give fixedpoint characterizations of the 
strongest and weakest intermediate assertion candidates for SAFE. 
Notation. For an ordered set N we will denote a tuple, indexed by the elements in N, 
by (4 )nEN or aN. 
4.2. Forward propagation 
In general, rule SAFE, unlike rule rev, does not have a unique least set of interme- 
diate assertions. Therefore we cannot hope to find, as we did in the invariance case, 
a forward operator whose least fixpoint gives the best possible intermediate assertions. 
The following is an example of an assertion graph that has two incomparable minimal 
(with respect to the order on &lNI defined pointwise by the implication relation) tuples 
of assertions satisfying SlS3. 
Example (Two minimal solutions for Sl-S3). Consider a graph with two nodes, 
N = No = {n1,n2}, labeled A(n,) :x = 0 and A(Q): y = 0, in which any two nodes 
are connected. This graph is an assertion graph for the property q (x = 0 V y = 0). 
Consider the transition system with 0 : x = 0 A y = 0 and only one transition, ZI, the 
idling transition, defined by pr : x’ = x A y’ = y. In this system there are two minimal 
solutions to Sl-S3, namely 
(Pn, :x=OAy=O (Pn, :F 
cpa :F ipn2 :x=OAy=O 
However, there is a subclass of graphs for which rule SAFE has a unique least set 
of intermediate assertions. This is the class of deterministic graphs. We say that an 
assertion graph G is deterministic if any model has at most one path in G starting 
in NO, that is, for any nl,n2 that are different, if nl,n2 E NO or for some m E N, 
(m,nl), (m,n2) E E then A(nl)r\A(n2) is unsatisfiable. Notice that in the above example 
G is not deterministic as nl,n2 E NO and A(q) A A(Q), which is x = 0 A y = 0, is 
satisfiable. 
We could restrict ourselves to deterministic graphs and still obtain a complete rule. 
But this is not necessary because we will show that we can deal with the general case 
by finding intermediate assertions for a stronger rule, STRONG-SAFE, shown in Fig. 8, 
that admits a unique least set of intermediate assertions for any graph G. 
Premises Sla and Slb strengthen premise Sl in SAFE, similarly S3a and S3b streng- 
then premise S3. 
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For transition system S = (V, O,‘T), 
general safety formula p, 
assertion graph G = (N, No, E. A) for p, and 
assertions {pn}n~~ 
Sla 0 A X(n) + %I n E NO 
Slb 0 --t VncNo x(n) 
s2 + A(n) TZEN 
S3a PCT, @J A X(m) + %I (n,m) E .I? 
S3b SW, WI) --t V(n,rn)~E x(m) * E N 
SCP 
Fig. 8. Rule STRONG-SAFE (general safety modified) 
Lemma 4. (i) If a set of intermediate assertions atisfies the premises of rule STRONG- 
SAFE, then it also satisjies the premises of rule SAFE. 
(ii) If G is deterministic then any set of intermediate assertions atisfying the 
premises of rule SAFE also satisfies the premises of rule STRONG-SAFE. 
Proof. (i) Let G be an assertion graph. Then Sla and Slb imply Sl. It is also the 
case that S3a and S3b imply S3 since for m E N: 
V (No, A J.(m)) + 
(n,m)EE 
(ii) Consider a deterministic assertion graph G. Then Sl and S2 imply Sib, and 
also S 1 and S2 imply Sla since 
a A 
by S2 
m#nAmENo 
S3 implies S3a since for (n,m) E E: 
by S3 
4 A(m) A /\ -n(m’) A 
G det. 
(n.m’)EE 
lil’#lll 
3 
&m> A A 7(Pm’ A 
by S2 
Ol.rn’)EE 
d#fn 
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S2 and S3 imply S3b, since 
Corollary 5. Rule STRONG-SAFE is sound. 
Lemma 6. Rule STR~NG-~AFE is complete for general safety formulas where temporal 
operators are not in the scope of quantifiers. 
Proof. The intermediate assertions given in the completeness proof for SAFE satisfy the 
pIWliS'3 Of STRONG-SAFE. 0 
Rule STRONG-SAFE, unlike rule SAFE, has a unique least set of intermediate asser- 
tions (if any). We will show that whenever a set of intermediate assertions for rule 
STRONG-SAFE exists, a least such set is the fixedpoint of the following monotone operator 
P~,J : dINI H dlNl defined pointwise, at each n E N, by 
F$(pN) A 
[ 
(0 An E NO) V v SP(y,-,& A A(n). 
hn)EE 1 
Notice that a tuple of formulas (PN satisfies Sla and S3a iff qN satisfies &((PN) --) (Pn 
for every n E N. 
If the sequence 
(F) nEN, &d(FhEN), ~~'((%Nh . . . 
converges to (P~,,N in finitely many steps, then (PF,“,N is the least fixedpoint of P,%J. 
The connection between the rule STRONG-SAFE and (P%N is given by the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 7. There exists a set of assertions satisfying the premises of rule STRONG 
SAFE ifs Slb holds and (PF,N satisjes S3b. Thus, (PF,,N precisely characterizes the 
(9, n)-accesible states. 
Proof. -+: Notice that S2 is always satisfied by (PEN, since c$JP~F,,, H !%((p~,v) and 
&((PF,:,N) -+ A(n) for 12 E N. cp.~, N is the least tuple CJ~~,“,N satisfying 
As we observed, this implies that URN satisfies Sla and S3a. If furthermore Slb 
and S3b hold, then SlaS3b are satisfied by (P9,N. 
=s: Assume there is a tuple (PN satisfying SlaS3b. We have to show that Slb holds 
and (P97,N satisfies S3b. (PN satisfies Sla and S3a and therefore 
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Since (PP,:.N is the least fixedpoint of &J we have 
(P.F,N+(Pn VnEN. 
Therefore, for every n, 
hence (p,%N satisfies S3b. 0 
Corollary 8. There exists a set of assertions satisfying the premises of rule SAFE if 
Sl b holds and (PzN satisjies S3b. 
4.3. Extended assertion graphs 
In order to show that a Iixedpoint of the forward propagation operator is a good 
set of intermediate assertions we have to check that it satisfies condition S3b. If an 
iterative propagation method is used to find the flxedpoint, rather than checking S3b 
after the fixedpoint has been reached, we can perform the check after each iteration. 
Checking S3b at each iteration can save time and in case of failure help produce a 
counterexample. For a graphical interpretation of this method, we define the (edge- 
complete) extension Ge of G which is a supergraph of G with the property that any 
sequence whose first state satisfies VnEN,’ l(n) has at least one path in G”. 
Suppose that nf and {ne}nEN are new distinct symbols not in N. Let G’ = (Ne,Nt, 
Ee, i.’ ) , where 
Ne=NU{n~}U{nc~n~N}, A”(n) = A(n) if n E N 
N; = N,,, l?ne) = 3Vcn,mj EE +>I 
E” = E U {(n, ne), (ne, nf) 1 n E N} A”(nf) = T. 
The ne nodes can be considered as escape nodes for those computations that after 
reaching n have nowhere to go in G. All the computations that fail to stay in G end 
looping in the node nf. Notice that if G is deterministic, using G” we can characterize 
the models of both p and up. A model c satisfies p iff its (unique) path in G” stays 
in N and conversely, it satisfies lp iff its first state does not satisfy VnENu n(n) or its 
path in Ge reaches a node in Ne\N. 
Example (G and Ge). Consider program PROD-CONS (Fig. 9), a simple version of a 
producer-consumer protocol. The statement produce x assigns some nonzero value to x 
and consume z sets z to 0. They do not change other variables. Statements request 
and release stand for the standard semaphores P and V. The causality property that 
a given value u is not consumed unless it was first produced can be expressed in 
temporal logic as 
Pcaus : 0 [z = 24 -+ ox = u]. 
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local e,f : integer where e = 1, f = 0 
+, y, t : integer where z = y = z = 0 
loop forever do loop forever do 
Prod :: 
Fig. 9. Program PROD-CONS. 
Fig. 10. An assertion graph G and its extension Ge for property pcaw. 
The nodes in Ne\N in the assertion graph depicted in Fig. 10 are drawn with two 
concentric ovals. 
We extend the definition of the forward operator 3$~ to all the nodes of Ge, so for 
all n E Ne, 
&((~~e) 4 
[ 
(0 in E N,e) v v SP(F,-,~) 1 A +). (m,n)EEe 
With this definition, condition S3b can be replaced by the condition that (P%~ is 
unsatisfiable for any n E Ne\N. If the sequence (F)nE~e, FN~((F)~~AR), S’$?)((F)nE~C), . . . 
converges in finitely many steps to (P~,N~, then p is Y-valid iff Sl b holds and for any 
n E Ne\N, q~,~ is unsatisfiable. 
Thus the bottom-up approach to verifying p consists of the following steps: check 
that Sl b holds, generate the least fixedpoint, c~ec,~, of %$ and check (at every step) 
that V’n E Ne\N, q~,~ is unsatisfiable. Notice that, unlike the invariance case, forward 
propagation for general safety formulas depends on the given property. 
Example (Generating intermediate assertions for rule SAFE). Consider again program 
PROD-CONS (Fig. 9), the temporal formula p ca,,s, and its assertion graph and extension 
in Fig. 10. 
The first three steps of the propagation sequence associated with Ge and program 
PROD-CONS are shown in Fig. 11. Each new disjunct is underlined and its source is 
specified. For instance, disjunct dZ1 is obtained in the first iteration from the initial 
condition 0. The disjunct d22 is obtained in the second iteration from the disjunct dZ1 
N. Bjmxer et al. I Theoretical Computer Science I73 (1997) 49-87 67 
first iteration 
($%J---] 
second iteration 
third iteration 
. . . 
where the disjuncts obtained are: 
dlI : CI, A mo A x=0 A (Y,Z) = (O,O) A (e,f)= (170) A u#O 
dz, : PO A mo A z=o 
dlz : eI A m. A 
A (;,r; T (iv;; A (e,f) = (170) A 21=x 
z#O A ( - A (qf) = (1,0) A u et0921 
&z : eI A m. A x#O A (Y:z) = (0:O) A (e,f)=(l,O) A u=z 
61 : Po A m. A z#O A (~32) = (0,O) A (e,f) = (1-O) A u=o 
62 : to A m. A z=o A (~32) = (070) A (e,f)=(l,O) A u=z 
d13 : e2 A m. A z#O A (Y,z) = (0,O) A (e,f)= (‘Lo) A u6! t&z) 
&3 : ez A m. A z#O A (y,z) = (0,O) A (e,f) = (0,o) A u = z 
&4 : PI A m. A z#O A (y,z) = (0,O) A (e,f) = (1,o) A u = z 
Fig. Il. First three iterations of the forward propagation process for program PROD-CONS and property pcaus. 
via the transition ~1,. The propagation is completed by the ninth iteration with (P,,; : F 
which proves that program PROD-CONS satisfies formula pcaus. 
Notice that we do not have to compute cp% ,,2 and cp~ ,,3. Since Ne\N is not reach- 
able from these nodes it is not important what the actual formulas are. (We could 
take ~9,~~ :x=u and q~,~~: T together with the other formulas to satisfy conditions 
Sl-S3). 
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The bottom-up method for proving a general safety formula p can also be used for 
debugging. With an assertion graph G and its extension Ge for p we generate assertions 
q~r, expressing the (Y,n)-accessible states, in stages. Stage i + 1 is obtained from 
stage i by applying $&. The propagation stops when we obtain a satisfiable q~,,i for 
12 E Ne\N and i > 0. By recording the history of previous iterations we can reconstruct 
the symbolic computation that ends outside G. 
Example (C~u~~e~exa~~les ~~~g forward p$~pagfft~o~). Consider again program 
PROD-CONS (Fig. 9). Suppose we want the protocol to have a lazy production prop- 
erty, namely that once the producer writes a value into x it will wait until that value 
is read by the consumer before assigning a new value to x. This property is expressed 
by the formula 
pord : q ~x=u-i((X=UAZ#U)W(X=UAz=u)) FKx#u] 
where u is an auxiliary integer variable used to record the value of x. Fig. 12 shows 
the graph G of all models of po& and its extension Ge. 
Table 1 shows the disjuncts produced in the first six applications of the forward prop- 
agation operator FN and maintains enough info~ation to construct an abstract counter- 
example. Besides the conjunctions listed, each row contains the conjunct z = 0. We 
stopped when we obtained a satisfiable disjunct for a node in Ne\N. A counterex- 
ample #1,$2 ,..., s&s6 ,... is generated by tracing back the origins of the first disjunct 
of C&c: 
in node no : q +at-&Aat-m~AO=x#uAy=OAz=OAe=lAf =0 
in node nl : s2/=at_~~Aatm~AO#x=uAy=OAz=OAe=lAf =0 
in node nt : s3 ~at_/~Aatm~AO#x=uA~y=OAz=OAe=OAf =0 
in node nl : s4~~t-LP3~atm~AO#x=ur\~y=uAz=OAe=OAf =0 
in node nl : ~~/==at-t?~Aat_m~AO#x=uAy=uAz=OAe=OAf=1 
in node ni : Sg~aat_~~r\atm,r\O#X#Ur\y=u~z=O/\e=O/\f =1 
Fig. 12. Graphs G and G’ for the formula pOti. 
N. Bjerner et al. I Theoretical Computer Science 173 (1997) 49-87 69 
Table I 
Six iterations of forward propagation for PROD-CONS and pord 
d it. WC Disjunct 
(Pno dOI 1 
do2 2 
do3 3 
doj 4 
&s 5 
a& 6 
dw 6 
%I dlI 2 
dlz 3 
di3 4 
d14 5 
dis 6 
dlb 6 
d17 6 
Y)n2 dzl 1 
%I; 41 6 
9,; 
0 
doI 
do2 
do3 
44 
dos 
dos 
doI 
dll 
da 
dn 
d14 
d14 
do5 
0 
du 
atlo A atmo A O=x#u A y=o A 
at_/, A atmo A Ofxfu A ,v-0 A 
at_/2 A atmo A O#x#u A y-0 A 
ad3 A atmn A Ofx#fu A .i’=x A 
at_to A aim0 A O#x#u A Y=x A 
at-f!3 A atmg A Ojxfu A Y#U A 
atJo A atml A Ofxfu A y=x A 
at.e, A arm0 A O#x=u A v-0 A 
at_/2 A atmo A O#x=u A _ -y=o ,, 
at-l3 A atmo A O#x=u A y=u A 
atlo A atmo A O#s=u A y=u A 
at-lo A atml A O#n=u A y=u A 
at-P1 A arm0 A O#x=u A v=u A 
at_!, A atmo A O#x=u A -y#u A 
at-/o A atmo A o=x=u A y=o A 
atl, A atmg A O#x#u A y = 14 A 
(e,f) = (1,O) 
(e,f’) = Cl,01 
(e,f) = (0.0) 
ie,f) = i070) 
(e,S) = @,I) 
(e.ff=(O,l) 
(e,f’) = (O,O) 
(e,.f) = (1,O) 
(e,J‘) = CO,01 
(e,f) = (0.0) 
(e,f’) = (0, I) 
(e.f’) = (Rot 
(e,f’) = (O,l) 
(e,f) = (O,l) 
(e,f‘) = fl,O) 
(e.ff = (0.1) 
The counterexample shows that it is possible that Prod produces a new value before 
Cons has had a chance to read the previous one. A fix to this problem is to switch 
statements 8, and s@]. 
4.4. Backward propagation 
The situation is simpler for backward propagation, where a largest solution to S2 
and S3 exists. The operator Bj,, : dlNl H diNl, on an assertion graph G, is defined 
pointwise as 
A tuple of formulas (PN satisfies S2 and S3 iff it satisfies (P,, -+ J%$&(P,~) for any 
n E N. If the sequence (T),E~,~~((T),E~),~~‘((T)nE~),... converges in finitely 
many steps to a tuple of formulas qg,~ then (PI,N is the maximal tuple satisfying 5’2 
and 53. The formula yarn characterizes those states s with the property that for any 
sequence of states s : SO = s, .q , . . . originating in s such that Vi 20 .si+l f T(si) there is 
a path ytc = n,nt,... in G starting in n such that for any i>O, si /= n(ni). Furthermore, 
p is Y-valid iff 0 --+ v qa.n. 
n E No 
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Thus a top-down approach to verifying p consists of first generating the greatest fixed- 
point, (P$@,N, of 9% and then checking that 0 -+ V, E NO (PB,,, holds. 
Example (Generating intermediate assertions for rule SAFE). Consider program BAKERY 
(Fig. 3) and the l-bounded overtaking property fioun,j 
tI1 [at_& ---f (at_tpz A ~fft~3)~((~t_~2 A #t~3)~((fft~z A ~atm3)~at~~))]. 
An assertion graph G for pbOWd is shown in Fig. 6. Forward propagation does not 
terminate, but the property can be proved using backward propagation. To compute the 
limit of the sequence (T),, e N, %$J((T)~ e N), &$?((T),, Ed), . . . we assume the invariant 
ofat_ez -+ y] 2 1). 
This invariant can be generated by several known approximation methods [3]. 
One iteration of 99 generates 42, = J,(a) for each IZ E N. In the second iteration 
we get 
@I, = G3 ) A WNZ A@3 > v G4 )I 
= (Tatmj A at_&) A WP(F, at_&!! V (-atmj A atJ2)) 
= (7atmj A at&) A (atmz --i y2 &s-y1 A y1 # 0) 
\ / 
WPbl, I ~atm~natJ~} 
=(latm3 A at_&) Aptm2 -“, y22ylj. 
by W~t.&-t,, b If 
The other 9”s remain at their previous values. A third application of D shows that a 
fixedpoint was reached. Since 0 implies (Pi,, and rzs E NO, premise 5’1 holds. Backward 
propagation has thus provided 
qnc : Tat_&, 
cp,, : latm3 A at.& 
qnz : atm3 A at-82, 
cpns : 7atm3 A at-4 A (atml -+ yz 2 yl), 
cpnr : at_& 
which are the necessary intermediate assertions to establish the l-bounded overtaking 
property. 
5. Approximate anaiysis 
As we have seen, there is no guarantee for success in forward and backward analysis. 
For infinite or even large finite-state systems, the propagation may not terminate or, 
even if the sequences converge in a finite number of iterations, we may not be able 
N. Bjmner et al. I Theoretical Computer Science 173 (1997) 49-87 11 
to prove it (we might not be able to prove for instance that F’+‘(F) -+ F-“(F)). 
A solution to the difficulties in generating invariants is to limit the search for valid 
properties and intermediate assertions to a domain 9 where we can find approximations 
to the least (greatest) fixedpoint of the forward (backward) operator. At a minimum, 
the domain 9 is required to support a partial order 6 corresponding to implication in 
the assertion language J&‘. The connection between 9 and & is given by a monotone 
function 
such that di dd2 implies y(dl) + y(dl). We say that 9 abstracts d and that y is 
the concretization function. Abstract interpretation, introduced in [5], offers a general 
framework for the study of abstractions that preserve certain properties. It has been 
used to lift the analysis of these properties to a domain where it is easier to carry out. 
Propagation performed on 9 will be called approximate analysis as opposed to the 
exuct analysis one can perform on d. 
5.1. Invariance 
To approximate a forward propagation operator 
.F::dHJd 
on the assertion domain, to an abstraction 9, we need a monotone operator3 
9 : 9 H 9 satisfying Y 0 y -+ y 0 F:. 
This property guarantees that, if for d E 9: 
B(d)bd 
then 
and therefore premises (11) and (13) of rule INV are satisfied. The implication in the 
conclusion is based on two implications: 
.p(y(d)) a y(p(d)) a Y(d). 
by Fey-yoF by monotonicity of 7 
Thus, the task of verifying up can be reduced to that of finding a d E 9, such that 
P(d)dd and y(d) + p (12). 
Similarly, a given backward propagator 9 can be approximated by 
3: 9~ 9 satisfying yoL4J-+goy 
3 The implication should be read as pointwise. Thus, for each d E ~8 F(y(d)) + y(g(d)) 
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since if one can find a d E 9 such that 
ddg(d) and 0 ----f y(d) (Il), 
then y(d) satisfies premises 11-13, and therefore q p is valid. 
Approximations p and g are only useful if the abstraction domain supports efficient 
methods to find solutions for F(d)<d, and d <g(d), respectively. 
5.2. Constructing approximation operators 
The construction of the approximate propagation operators depends on the abstraction 
domain 9. This section identifies a set of assumptions about available operations on 9 
that allow a uniform construction of these operators. 
Since 9 is constructed using disjunction and SP it will be useful to have similar 
operations in 9. Assume therefore, as in abstract interpretation, that 9 is an upper 
semilattice with a join operator U, which is weaker than its boolean counterpart, i.e., 
for dl,d2 E 9, y(dl) V y(d2) + y(dl LI dz), and there are monotone 
SP2 : 9-9 satisfying sp 0 y -+ y 0 sP, 
OS: 9 satisfying 0 + y(P). 
Then we can define the forward propagation operator by 
By construction it will satisfy 
Similarly if $9 is a lower semilattice, with a strengthening meet operator fl, i.e., for 
dl,d2 E 9, y(dl ll d2) -+ y(dl) A y(dz), and there are monotone 
WPO : 9l-t9 satisfying y 0 WP9 + WP 0 y, 
p2 : 9 satisfying y(p’) -+ p. 
Then 
g(d) A p9 n wpB(9-,d) 
satisfies 
Alternatively one can, as in constraint programming, require u and F’ to generate 
normal forms in 9, and require 9 to support an incremental satisfiability check [13]. 
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5.3. Finitary propagation - invariance 
We now study an example where forward propagation is performed on a finite 
propositional subset of the assertion language. This gives a finite abstraction domain 
$8, where the relation < can be reduced to a propositional decision problem. The 
operator s+ will however be defined in terms of SP, and this will require a restriction 
of first-order reasoning. 
The parameterized program shown in Fig. 13 implements a simple protocol for 
ordering access to location 8, among N processes. It uses two arrays j and a originally 
initialized to 1 and F, respectively. Each process P[n] starts at location fo and resides 
in the while-loop, until every process P[m] with lower index has set a[m] to T. 
For each i between 1 and N we associate transitions corresponding to the locations 
ko[i],tl [i],&[i], and &[i]. For example the transition associated with location &,[i] 
moves control to {~[i] if j[i] < i, otherwise it moves control to &[i]. 
The following two temporal properties specify the system’s safety requirements 
Invariance I : •[m<n-t~(e3[mlr\e,[nl)l 
Precedence P : mo < no ---t (- &[mo] A 1 t3[no])W(t3[mo] A 1 t,[no]). 
The invariance property implies that two different processes do not reside simultane- 
ously at the critical location 4. The precedence property implies that processes with 
lower indices get priority entering the location cj. 
Forward and backward propagation directly on the assertion language d is inade- 
quate to handle parameterized transition systems. The unbounded number of processes 
necessitates introduction of quantifiers over the range [ l..N]. Since each propagation 
step only considers the advance of one process, a potentially unbounded number of 
propagation steps are necessary to cover the search space. 
One way to analyze the program in a finitary way is to restrict the assertion language 
over which program states can be described. In a way specifically tailored for the 
example, we restrict atomic propositions to be in one of the following forms: 
a[m] a[n] j[m] <n j[m] = n m <n m<n ~o[wz]..~~[~]. 
in N : integer where IV > 0 
local j : array [l..N] of [l..N] where j = 1 
a : array [l..N] of boolean where a = F 
&: while j[i] < i do 
[ 
e,: await a[j[i]] 
II,N,,P[i] :: e,: $1 := j[i] t 1  &: a[;] :=T 
e4: 
Fig. 13. Program ORDER. 
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An assertion cp in this restricted language 9 is a boolean combination of these atomic 
propositions. An assertion in d is obtained projecting cp E 9 to y( cp) =V’n, m : [ l..N] . cp 
in d. As U we take disjunction V, which satisfies y(q) V y($) + y(cp V II/) since 
(~x.cp)V(~x.~) -+ Vx.(cpV t,b). Control can be represented in a number of ways. Here, 
the most economical representation is in terms of one array 7~: [l..N] H [0..4]. So 
ej[i] is shorthand for z[i] = 3, which states that process P[i] resides at location &. 
The abstraction of the initial condition in 9, is 
@: eo[m] A w[m] A j[m] <n. 
Since initially all processes reside at location 80, only transition eo[i] has any effect on 
the initial condition. The strongest post-condition SP (Y, @) is therefore, 
e,“[m] A x[m] A j[m] d n A c$[i] A 
3zp, i . 
Ii 
n = update(d’, 1, i) A j[i] < i 
V 
n = updute(np, 3, i) A j[i] 2 i 
which does not belong to 9. We used update(qv,i) as shorthand for Lj. if i = j 
then v else x[j]. To eliminate the existential quantifier one distinguishes between two 
cases i = m and i # m to obtain the simplified form SP~(Y, OS): 
&[m] A x[m] A j[m] 6n 
V&[m] A la[m] A j[m] <n A j[m] = m 
Vtl [m] A x[m] A j[m] dn A j[m] < m. 
The subformula j[m] = m is shorthand for m = n + j[m] = n. 
More formally, we define SPO as a o SP o y, where a : d + 9 is an abstraction 
mapping satisfying the Galois insertion properties: CI o y = Id and y o a<Zd, that is 
for every d E 9, cr(y(d)) = d, and for every cp E JZZ, y(a(cp)) + cp. For this purpose 
it suffices to take a(q) as the strongest possible d E 9, such that k cp --+ y(d). Since 
validity (k) in general is undecidable in d one can fix a maximal derivation length 
k and search for the strongest d E 9 (9 is in this example finite, and < in 9 can be 
decided by propositional reasoning) such that k cp -+ y(d) with a derivation length at 
most k. Notice that SP o y + y o SPY as required. 
The bottom-up search is presented in Fig. 14. Each level corresponds to an iteration 
of F. The arrows indicate how F follows the flow of control. Forward propagation 
9 itself works on the disjunction of all nodes below each level when obtaining the 
next level. The disjunction of the assertions listed in the graph’s nodes is a fixedpoint 
of 3. We refer to the fixedpoint as ‘py. The assertion Vm, n : [l..N].cpg strengthens 
I and can be used successfully in rule INV to prove I. 
In [4] unskolemization is applied to generate first-order intermediary assertions for 
proving partial correctness of flow-chart programs. Their approach resembles forward 
propagation by breadth-first search through candidate invariance properties. The 
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728 : &[m] A ~U[rn]A 
j[m] < m A (n 5 j[m] -+ 
Tel 
n,‘3 : &[m] A %[m]r\ 
j[m] < m A (n < j[m] -+ a[ 
reo,t 
ng : &[m] A a[m]A 
j[m] = m A (n < j[m] -+ u[n]) 
Q3 
n5 : .$[m] A Tu[m] Aj[m] 5 m A (n < j[m] + a[n]) 
723 : l,[m] A x[m 
j[m] < m A (n = 
n4 : 14[m] A a[m]A 
j[m] 5 12 A j[m] = m 
% % 
n1 : !,[m] A w[m] A 
j[m] 5 n A j[m] 
3[m] A Ta[m] A 
5 nAj[m] =m 
Q. ,t T&l,J 
no : co[m] A Tu[m] A j[m] 5 n 
Fig. 14. Approximated state space for ORDER 
candidates are generated using unskolemization as a weakening heuristic to obtain 
appropriate logical consequences. 
The precedence property P is treated in Section 5.7. 
5.4. Generating invariants in the closed convex polyhedra domain 
The convex polyhedra abstraction was first studied as a tool in the analysis of 
programs in [6]. More recently, convex polyhedra have also been used in the analysis 
of linear hybrid systems [9, 121. We first summarize the method (following [6]) and 
give an example of its use in the generation of invariants. 
A closed convex polyhedron P (Fig. 15) is a formula /ji Li where each Li is a weak 
inequality, i.e., 
L; = C aijxj 3 bi. 
P can be viewed as the set of solutions of its system of linear constraints 
P = {qAx>b}. 
We say that P = {X 1 AT<&} satisfies a linear constraint E.Z<d if P = {X 1 AT<&Z.T 
<d}, that is, C . F<d is linearly dependent on the constraints in A%<b. 
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(a) Constraint representation (b) Generator representation 
Fig. 15. Representations of a polyhedron: (a) constraint representation; (b) generator representation. 
Another represen~tion of P is given by a system of generators: a finite set of rays 
R and a finite set of vertices V such that 
where P is the convex closure of this system of generators. Both representations are 
used in the standard inclusion decision procedure. 
The domain @ of closed convex polyhedra (with rational coefficients) is an abstrac- 
tion of the assertion language &’ with the concretization function given by the inclusion 
y : @ i--i d. The partial order, minimal and maximal elements are the subset relations, 
the empty set, and the total set which are mapped by y into the implication relations, 
F and T, respectively. 
An approximation of 9 in @ is 
where 
u is the convex hull operator: PI u P2 is the smallest closed convex 
polyhedron that includes PI and P2. The convex hull can be computed using the gen- 
erator representations: if (Ri, VI) and (&, V,) are the generator epresentations for 
PI and Pz then (R, U 112, VI U V2) is a generator representation for PI Ll Pz. 
so@ g u, SP@‘(T, cp), where SP@(T, cp)(V) ~2 3Vp . (pf)( VP, V) A cp( VP)). Notice 
that 3 x is an operator on @. Indeed, it can be shown that 3x. P= PU (l\,_+(y '0)). 
cp@ E @ is such that (T, + cp @. For a given cp we can compute such an cp@ by first 
rewriting qn = cl A . * . A ck and then taking CP@ e A{ci 1 Ci is linear}. 
The sequence 
PO : F, P, : F(P,), P2 : F(P,),. . . 
does not necessarily converge in finitely many steps (it actually might not even 
converge in @). However it is possible to achieve convergence using a widening 
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operator [6]. This is an operator v: @ x @ H @ such that 
(Wl) for any Pl,Pz E @, PI UP2 + PlvP2, 
(W2) for any PO + PI + in @, the sequence P& Pi,. defined by Pk = PO and 
P(+, = P!oPi+l converges in a finite number of steps. 
Several widening operators appear in the literature. The simplest is defined by 
p2 if PI = F, 
P,"Pz 4 
( 
the polyhedron defined by the 
constraints of Pisatisfied by PZ otherwise. 
The widening operator can be used to obtain the sequence 
PI,: F, P; : P&vF(P;), P;: P;&(P;),... 
which, by (W2), converges after finitely many iterations. The above sequence conser- 
vatively approximates PO, PI,. . and therefore its limit is a solution of F(P) -+ P. 
Most widening operators have the property that the constraints of PIVPZ are a subset 
of the constraints of PI (if PI # F). Thus the constraints of the limit polyhedron are 
a subset of the constraints of the polyhedron to which the first widening has been 
applied. For this reason, forward propagation with widening usually converges to a 
better solution if we start with a few iterations without widening. We will use this 
observation in our examples. 
Example (Generation of invariants). Consider program LOOP (Fig. 16). We will use 
it to illustrate how we can obtain the basical loop invariants using the polyhedra 
abstraction. Indeed, we will show how we can generate the invariant 0 < y <N. 
To illustrate the method and the need for a widening operator, we present in Fig. 17 
a few terms of the infinitely increasing sequence 
P,:F(F), P23(P,), P,:37P,),... 
as well as a few terms of the sequence 
P;:F(F), P;:P; uF(P;), P;:P;vF(P;),... 
local y : integer where y = 0 
N : integer where N 2 0 
1 &: while y 5 N - 1 do y := y + 1 
Fig. 16. Program LOOP 
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PI: y=o 
N>O 
I N 
i Y 
P; : y = 0 
N>O 
N 
i Y 
Pz: O<y<l 
ML9 
N 
P Y 
Pi: o<y< 
NLy 
N 
jL Y 
Fig. 17. The sequences PO, PI,. . and P&F’{ . . . . 
that converges in finitely many steps. A polyhedral forward propagation operator 
p for LOOP can be defined from 
@@A y=0~N>tI, 
P:h, r Ay<N-lr\y’=y+l, 
P& k y>N. 
For simplicity we ignore the two label variables 80 and 8,. (Taking them into account 
generates 4-dimensional polyhedra.) 
Partitioning the state space into sets that have the same location we could generate 
a stronger invariant for the transition system LOOP: 
5.5. General safety 
Approximations of the propagation operators follow the lines of simple invariance 
properties, only here the operators 9~ and 39~ work on N-mples of assertions, and it 
will be convenient o extend operations y and relations --+, d pointwise to tuples. 
Hence the forward operator 
9* : &$m H &@I 
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defined on a graph G can be approximated by any weakening 
-jzN 1 NISI H Qpi satisfying @v 0 7 + y 0 &v. 
This ensures, that whenever one can find a & E 9jNI, such that 
pN(dh’) <d,,, 
then 
Any fixedpoint dN of pv therefore corresponds to a tuple y(dN), that satisfies Sla 
and S3a. One can, furthermore, check if y(dn) satisfies S2 and S3b, to see if it can be 
used to establish the safety property modeled by G. We notice, that if any fixedpoint 
of F satisfies S2 and S3b, then the least fixedpoint will. 
For backward propagation, the situation is analogous. The backward operator 
.y/y : &IN1 H .O1lNI 
can be approximated by a s~en~hening 
& : @w H #Jl satisfying y 0 L&. + 9& 0 y. 
Then, whenever dN E L21Ni satisfies 
& < gN(div )> 
we have 
Any fixedpoint of gX will therefore satisfy S2 and S3. The greatest fixedpoint will 
~~he~ore have the best chances to satisfy Sl. 
5.6. Constructing approximation operators 
To obtain FN and &IN uniformly from the labelings of the assertion graph 
G = (N,No,E, 2.) we associate G = (N,~o,E,~~), where the labehng function has 
been replaced by a stronger n”, y o J.” --+ R. For forward propagation we assume that 
9, besides sp9 and U, is equipped with a meet operator i7, which is weaker than A, 
i.e., y(dl) A y(dz) -+ y(dl n d2) for every dl,d2 E 9. We could take the definition of 
9~ and replace conjunction with meet and disjunction with join. This results in 
F&dN) ~2 A”(n) fl 
[ 
0” An E NO L.I SP’ 
i~~~~~~drn)] . 
However, since in any lattice distributing n inwards produces maller results, 
(cila)Ll(cllb)~cll(aLlb) 
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and since SPO is monotone, the definition 
Fn(dN) A (P(n) n @ An E No) u u (P(n) n SP9(9-Jd,)) 
(m,nW 
results in a better approximation of Z+N. When SP% is expressed in terms of the 
individual transitions in Y, i.e., s~~(F,dd) = UrEF SP~(Z,~), we distribute n9(n) hr- 
ther inwards. For brevity we therefore introduce the shorthand 
SP$(Z,d) 4 n”(n) n SP9(Z,d). 
Analogously, for backward propagation we assume 9 equipped with a join operator LI, 
which is stronger than disjunction, besides the stronger meet n. Then 
S&(&J) 62 I?(n) n WP9 
(%kdm) 
produces a useful approximation of 8~. 
5.7. Finitary propagation - safety 
Returning to the program in Fig. 13 we can now establish the general safety property: 
Precedence : m0 < n0 + (+3[m01 A 7% [no]) W ((3Lm01 A 743in01). 
The systematic construction of & gives a formal and automated argument for its 
validity. The assertion graph generated from the precedence property is given in Fig. 18. 
The set of initial nodes is given by NO = {nr,ns,ns}, and for X = (x~,x~,x3,x4,xs,x~) 
the assertion graph defines & 4 by 
4, (X) = @It ) A O9 
&(X) = 2(Q) A SP9(ZX1 Vxz) 
F&) = n(n3) A o9 
F&f) = A(n4) A SP9(KXz) 
We have thus extended the propositional language to contain atoms with the variables 
no and mo. The projection from 9 to the assertion language & is the same as before: 
cp E 9 projects to y(q) = Vm, n : [l..N] .cp. As n we have taken A, which trivially 
4 The equation for FD6 does not follow the general guidelines for construction of z but is obtained by 
optimization based upon the label in ng. 
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> -f 
n1 : mo < noA 725 : mo < 720 A 
7[3[m01 A -7~3[n01 
4 
n2 : Tt3[m01 A TE3[n 724 : t3[m01 A Te3[n01 
Fig. 18. Assertion graph for the Precedence property 
satisfies the weakening condition, since y(cp A $) is in fact equivalent to y(q) A y(e). 
To find qZ:,N E 91”’ such that 9jv((pgN) d (PF,, it suffices to find a solution for x2 in 
x2 < 1&[mo] A 7J[no] A SPS(9@o < no A 43[mo] A 77!3[no] A @) v x2). 
The formula cp 5 Am0 < 1t0 A +3 [me] A +s [no] works here, and is generated in the same 
way as ‘pi was in Fig. 14. The rest of (PF~ is extracted directly from the definition 
of FN. Checking the resulting (PF,~ against S3b finally establishes the validity of the 
precedence property. 
5.8. General safety analysis in the closed convex polyhedra domain 
Let G be an assertion graph and G a strengthened graph labeled by I@ : N H @ c d 
such that 
A@(n) + R(n). 
In the exact analysis we have used extension graphs to stop the propagation as soon 
as we have found a computation that cannot be contained in the assertion graph. It 
is possible to use this method in the approximate analysis as well, however l(ne) = 
-(V Cne,mjEE A(m)) has to be replaced by the weaker condition +/(n,mjEE A@(m)) --+ 
L@(ne). This condition ensures that if P Ne are a solution of the forward propagation 
operator on G” and all the polyhedra corresponding to nodes in G” -G are empty then 
the systems satisfies the specification. 
In the analysis of non-parameterized systems we can define an approximation of 
9~ in @ as in Section 5.6. For parameterized transitions, we will present later in 
this section one possible definition of spf(z,P) and of the concretization function y 
such that SP,(Z, y(P)) -+ y(spf(z, P)). Under these conditions, Fve has all the desired 
properties, except that the ascending sequence 
(FLEN~, ~Ne(PNC,O), ~Ne(pNe,l >, . . . 
--- 
hc.0 eve.1 he.2 
does not necessarily converge. We could use again a widening operator to speed up the 
convergence process. However, the widening operator of Section 5.4 does not guarantee 
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that a solution 9~~ has the property that 5~ E Ne . qn --+ L@(n). This motivates the 
following definition: 
A bounded widening operator is an operator v : (91, (~2, $1 H cp1 G 92, where 
(Wl’) for any P1,P2,P E @, PI Ll P:! --+ PI GP2, 
(W2’) for any PO t PI 3 . . . in Q, and P E @, the sequence P&P{,. . . defined by 
Pb = PO and Pi+, = Pi 4 Pi+1 converges in finitely many steps, 
(W3) for any PI, Pz, P f @, if PI -+ P and P2 + P then P, GP2 -+ P. 
An example of such a bounded operator is 
p2 if PI = F, 
PI GP2 = 
the polyhedron defined by 
the constraints of PI satisfied by P2 and 
the constraints of P satisfied by PI, P2 otherwise. 
For a forward operator bounded by P the bounded widening operator can be used to 
obtain converging sequences bounded by P. For any n E N”, the sequence 
converges in finitely many steps to a limit that is bounded by 2@(n). 
Example. The program MUX-AST presented in Fig. 19 implements mutual exclusion by 
add-and-store instructions. The M processes coordinate their entry to the critical sec- 
tions using the shared variable y. Each process has a local variable f. A non-negative 
value for t signals that the process can enter its critical section. 
The property we want to verify is that if process k reaches & and no other process 
is at L”,& or /s then no other process will access its critical region before process k. 
For this we will in~odu~e the auxiliary variables Ni for i E {6,7,8} that will count 
how many processes are at location t$. An augmented transition system takes Ni into 
in M : integer where M > 0 
local y : integer where y = 1 
/It”=, P[i] :: 
iocaf t : integer 
&,: : loop forever do 
‘e,: noncritical 
e,: t := -1 
&: while t < 0 do 
k$: await y>O 
e,: it. y) := fy - 1, y - 1) 
&: if 2 = 0 then 
.?7: critical 
e,: y:=y+i 
Fig. 19. Program MUX-AST. 
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account: 
6,: 0 A N6 = N, = Ns = 0 
L,, [il : PrJi]ANi=Ng+1ANj=N7ANi=Ns 
. 
It can be shown that any computation of the original transition 
computation of the augmented system. This justifies its use in 
The property can now be expressed in temporal logic as 
system corresponds to a 
the verification process. 
pfirst : Ibk#m<M --f ((&[k] A N6.3 = 1 A 0 &[kl) 
* (kk[kl A +7i[m1) w t7Wlh 
where Nb..s is shorthand for N6 + NT + Ns. 
This property cannot be proven using forward propagation in cf, by itself. However, 
it is possible to prove it by combining forward propagation in @ with other invariant 
generation methods. An established invariant ox can be used in the approximate anal- 
ysis to strengthen the labelings of all the nodes in the assertion graph or an extended 
supergraph of the assertion graph. The invariant used in this example is 
where 
Xl[j] = [6[j] <N6 A Njl G’f7 A &[jl d&> 
X&l = &[kl + &[j] <N6. 
An assertion graph Gcrst for this property is shown in Fig. 20. For ease of presentation, 
we have omitted some of the unreachable nodes. For instance, we have eliminated 
the nodes that contained the conjunct &[k] A &[k]. We have also omitted the nodes 
generated from node no as no node in G$,, - Gfirst is reachable from it. 
A node of an assertion graph for cp can be split into a cluster of nodes each cor- 
responding to a disjunct of its labeling. The resulting graph is also an assertion graph 
for 9. Such a splitting results in a tighter approximation in the polyhedra domain and 
is therefore done whenever possible. Another method used in this example to obtain 
a better polyhedral approximation is to rewrite inequalities involving integer variables 
as a disjunction of weak inequalities. For example, the node 114, labeled by 4n4) : 
k # m A & [k] can split into two nodes labeled m d k - 1 A /5 [k] and m > k + 1 A & [k], 
respectively. 
A strengthened graph Gfirst and an extension of it are presented in Fig. 21. The 
variables considered in the analysis are the shared variables of the processes and the 
local variables of the processes k,m and of a generic process i # k. For a process 
P[j], let I$ be the local variables t, &,&,[7 corresponding to process P[j]. The set of 
variables considered in the analysis is then {M, N6, NT, Ns, y, k, m, i} U 6 U V, U f$. The 
labelings of all the nodes Gcrst except no contain the conjunct m # k. Therefore all 
these nodes were split into copies corresponding to m d k - 1 and m 3 k+ 1, respectively. 
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l<k#m<M 
: (e7[m] v +[k]v 
&..a # 1) * -+,[kl 
Fig. 20. The assertlon graph Ghrst for the formula phrst. 
For convenience, only the nodes for m <k - 1 are represented in Fig. 2 1. All the nodes 
in G&t are labeled either by i 6 k - 1 or i2 k + 1 and again only the nodes for 
i d k - 1 have been represented. The conjunct x@ = ~1 [k] A ~1 [m] A ~1 [i] A ~z[m] A xz[i] 
in the labelings of the nodes for which k # m is an approximation of x in CD. Indeed 
XA~#~+Y(X@). 
The forward propagation operator associated with GE,, is defined as in Section 5.6 
with SP~(Z,(P) given by 
s&7, cp> 2 =:(+I, cp) 
u 4m4 cp) 
LI spf(z[i],(p) A 1 di<k - 1 
L. spf(z[i], q) A k + 16 i <A4 
LJ $6 . 
( 
s$(z[i], cp) A 1 di dk - 1 
U spf’(z[i],(p) A k + 1 di<M > ’ 
As concretization function we take y defined by 
y(P[i]) = Vi E [l..M] . (i # k --) P[i]). 
It can be shown that sP,({7[_i]}j, y(P[i])) ---f y(sP~({7[j]}j,P[i])) and therefore this will 
define a good approximation of the forward propagation operator. 
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Fig. 21. A strengthened graph C& for Gfirst and an extension CFlrst for it, where x@ = xl[k] A 
x1Cml A Xl[il A x:iml A x214 
Forward propagation for the nodes in Fig. 21 resuits in the following polyhedra: 
6 = @A A@(%) for flS E {nll,nl2,nl3,nl4,n2,n4), 
P3=1/1A;1~(n3)At[k]=OAN7= lA~[~]+~~[~]~OA~[i]+~~[~]~O, 
P5 = 41, A Xqn5) A t[&] = 0, 
Ps = J/ A xqn,) A t[k] = 0 A iv7 = 0 A t[m] + &[m] GO A t[i] + &[i] go, 
PC = P; = Pf = F, 
where 
The propagation on the nodes with m 3 k + 1 or i 3 k -I- 1 yields similar results. As all 
the poIyh~~a in GE,, - Cfirst are empty we have MUX-AST /= pgrst. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper presented a new inference rule, SAFE, for proving arbitrary general safety 
properties expressed in linear-time temporal ogic. It generalizes the usual inference 
rule for proving invariance properties. The intermediate assertions needed for the ap- 
plication of the rule can be found in two dual ways: as least and greatest fixedpoints, 
respectively. As this is usually not possible, we applied and developed tools from 
abstract inte~retation to find approximations. In the case studies we developed new 
methodologies for abstract interpretation of parameterized programs. 
The approach taken for the generation of invariants and intermediary assertions 
was to reduce a verification problem to domains that admit specialized and efficient 
constraint-solving methods, In prescribing general methodologies for such reductions 
we have not attempted to use special control features of the analyzed systems. Instead 
we outline how new automatic invariant generation and strengthening methods can be 
obtained by finding a suitable approximation domain, a suitable constraint language 
over this domain, and sufficiently powerful constraint-solving procedures for this con- 
straint language. A main challenge for further work is to identify useful domains that 
admit efficient cons~aint-solvers. 
Acknowledgements 
We thank Martin Abadi, Luca de Alfaro, Henny Sipma, and Tomas Uribe for their 
many helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank the two anony- 
mous referees for their helpful suggestions. 
References 
[l] S. Bensalem, Y. Lakhnech and H. Saidi, Powerful techniques for the automatic generation of invariants, 
in: Proc. 8th Internat. Conf on Computer Aided Yerification, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
Vol. 1102 (Springer, Berlin, 1996) 323-335. 
[2] N. Bjomer, LA. Browne, E. Chang, M. Colon, A. Kapur, 2. Manna, H.B. Sipma and T.E. Uribe, STeP: 
The Stanford Temporal Prover, User’s Manual, Tech. Report STAN-CS-TR-95-1562, Computer Science 
Department, Stanford University, 1995. 
[3] N. Bjarner, LA. Browne and Z. Manna, Automatic generation of invades and inte~~iate assertions, 
in: 1st Internat. ConJ: on Principles and Practice qf Constraint Programming, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, Vol. 976 (Springer, Berlin, 1995) 589-623. 
[4] R. Chadha and D.A. Plaisted, On the mechanical derivation of loop invariants, J. Symbol. Comput. 
15(5) (1993) 705-744. 
[S] P. Cousot and R. Cousot, Abstract interpretation: a unified lattice model for static analysis of programs 
by construction or approximation of fix points, in: 4th ACM Symp. Principles of Progrum~~~ng 
Languages (ACM Press, New York, 1977) 238-252. 
[6] P. Cousot and N. Halbwachs, Automatic discovery of linear restraints among the variables of a program, 
in: 5th ACM Symp. Principles of Programming Languages (1978) 84-97. 
[7] D. Dill and H. Wong-Toi, Verification of real-time systems by successive over and under approximation, 
in: P. Wolper, ed., Proc. 7th Internat. Conf on Computer Aided Verification, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science (Springer, Berlin, 1995) 409-422. 
N. Bjwner et ul. I Theoretical Computer Science 173 (1997) 49-87 87 
[8] S.M. German and B. Wegbreit, A synthesizer of inductive assertions, IEEE Trans. Software Eng. I 
(1975) 68-75. 
[9] N. Halbwachs, P. Raymond and Y.-E. Proy, Verification of linear hybrid systems by means of convex 
approximations, in: 1st Znternar. Static Analysis Symp., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 864 
(Springer, Berlin, 1994). 223-237. 
[IO] D. Hare], Statechatts: a visual approach to complex systems, Tech. Report CS84-05, Dept. of Applied 
Mathematics, Weizmann Institute of Science, 1984. 
[I I] N. Heintze, Set Based Program Analysis, Ph.D. Thesis, Carnegie Mellon University, 1992. 
[ 121 T.A. Henzingcr and P.-H. Ho, Algorithmic analysis of nonlinear hybrid systems, in: P. Wolper, ed., Proc. 
7111 Intern&. Cor$ on Computer Aided Ver$cation. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 939 
(Springer, Berlin, 1995) 2255238. 
[13] J. Jaffar and M.J. Maher, Constraint logic programming: a survey, J. Logic Programming 19-20(3) 
(1994) 503-581. 
[ 141 M. Karr, Affine relationships among variables of a program, Acta Inform. 6 (1976) 133 -I 5 1. 
[l5] S. Katz and %. Manna, Logical analysis of programs, Comm. ACM 19(4) (1976) 188-206. 
[16] K. Lautenbach, Exacte Bedingungen der Lebendigkeit fur eine Klasse von Petri-Netzen (Precise 
conditions for liveness of a class of Petri-nets). St. Augustin, GMD Bonn, 82, 1973. 
[17] %. Manna and A. Pnueli, Temporal Verification of‘ Rrartitre Systemx Sqfity (Springer, New York, 
1995). 
